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A squadron of five helicopters swooped down over
the sleepy village, awakening the population with a
barrage of gun fire and killing several villagers who
were out in the open and unable to find shelter. A few
days later, a troop of sorne hundred soldiers sur-
rounded the area making escape impossible. They
closed in and demanded a village assembly in the
main square. The officer told the villagers that they
had 15 days to "repent their sins" and admit their sup-
port of the guerrilla movement. The officer expected
the villagers to come forward with names of people
who were guerrilla members, or families who har-
boured and fed them. If they didn't, they would
witness a far greater retribution than they had ex-
perienced a few days before. Stories of military
atrocities carried out in other villages, and this par-
ticular experience, were enough to have the Perez
family and sorne 50 others pack up their meager
belongings and start their long trek through the
Guatemala forests into Mexico.
Numbers
The total number of refugees in Mexico from
Guatemala is now estimated at 200,000. (The most re-
cent large entry occurred in June 1983, in the Ococ-
ingo area of Chiapas where sorne 1,000 refugees
crossed the border en masse.) Sorne 90,000 of these,
principally children, women and older people, reside
across a narrow strip along the Mexico-Guatemala
border with the highest concentration found in the
San Cristobal region where there are 77 settlements
and 18 camps with 45,000 refugees.
Background
Guatemalan - refugees in Mexico are primarily in-
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In Guatemala, the long history of ruthless military dic-
tatorship reached its apex under the recently deposed
regime of Efrain Rios Montt. Since the overthrow of
Jacobo Arbenz Guzman's government in 1954, the mil-
itary has exercised an uninterrupted control over the
country. In the last 30 years, an estimated 50,000 to
80,000 people have died at the hands of the military -
the vast majority of them peasants and rural workers.
In recent years the violence has intensified under the
rules of GeneraIs Lucas Garcia and Rios Montt. In the
face of rising opposition worker mobilization (par-
ticularly resulting from the reconstruction efforts
following the earthquake of 1976), the government
established a conscious policy of subverting possible
opposition.
The first phase of the policy was targeted at communi-
ty leaders (in particular, clerical workers). As phase
one failed to counteract the mounting activity of the
guerrilla movement, a second phase was institu-
tionalized under Lucas Garcia and intensified under
Rios Montt which involved bombing and large-scale
harrassment. Its intent was to destroy the ''base'' of
guerrilla activity. The increased repression involved
destroying food supplies by burning peasant fields and
killing livestock, as weIl as systematic elimination of
"suspected" guerrillas. Moreover, the repression
assumed a racist dimension as most of the perceived
opposition was seen to come from the Indian popula-
tions (600/0 of the country).
Following the coup d'etat in March of 1982 which
brought Rios Montt to power, sorne speculated that
the spiral of political violence would cease. Instead,
matters worsened. On July 30, 1982, Rios Montt
Continued on page 10
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digenous people belonging to various
tribes of the Maya people such as the
Quiches, the Ixiles, and the Ketchis.
Proud of their culture, ethnic and fami-
ly traditions, almost aIl are poor
farmers or small tradesmen. Most
come from the high plains where they
took shelter after the Spanish Conquest
and during successive regimes. None of
the ruling elites were prepared to give
the Indian population even a limited
opportunity to participate in the
political, social and economic life of
the country. Given their numbers and
cultural homogeneity, the indigenous
Maya people are apparently con-
sidered a major threat to the ruling
oligarchy rooted in the small elite of
non-Mayan descente
As a consequence of the state's policy
and military strategies, Indians have
had to abandon their centuries-old
habitat in the high plains; they have
seen their communal mode of living
broken and they have lost their link to
the earth of their forefathers. To
safeguard the only thing of value left,
i.e., life, often suffering from torture
and mutilation, they wandered
through the forests and mountains,
hiding in inhospitable places often up
to 12 months with a bare minimum of
clothes; food, or medicine, eating tree
roots and leaves. Thousands died dur-
ing this long trek due to malnutrition
and illness. Many more who made it
across the border into Mexico died as a
result of their deplorable health condi-
tions.
Personal testimonies, assembled and
documented by the Mexican Commis-
sion for Aid to Refugees (COMAR),
provide evidence of the planned
violence aimed at systematically exter-
minating the indigenous Maya people
and their culture in Guatemala. This
interpretation of the facts is quite
distinct from the Guatemalan official
line which presents the basic struggle as
a confrontation between capitalism
and communism.
Immediate Causes
The military counter-insurgency opera-
tion of the Guatemalan Army consists
of four basic strategies:
• a "scorched earth" policy aimed at
isolating the guerrillas from the Indian
population which is accused of pro-
viding shelter, feeding the guerrillas,
and providing recruits;
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• the creation of "strategic hamlets"
where those dislocated by the burning
villages and massacres can be limited in
their activities and brought under strict
control of the army;
• the establishment of a "civil defense"
into which young and older men are
recruited to "spy" on their own people
for any possible links with the guer-
rillas;
• a IJcivic action" programme, as part of
a so-called IJrural pacification" policy,
that forces the Indian population to
rebuild that which has been burned by
the military and to engage in public
works for the army.
In Guatemala's interior, the army con-
tinues its excesses while the outside
world is largely kept ignorant of the real
facts. How many would venture into
the interior for first-hand observation
and interviews after the slayings of
three Dutch reporters in 1982? Such a
situation has given the military the up-
per hand in manipulating the media and
world public opinion. The refugees
themselves fear reprisaI if they speak
about the atrocities.
Incursions of the Guatemalan
Army Into Mexican Territory
Not only has the Guatemalan army
been active within its own country, it
has attempted to maintain strong
physical and psychological control over
the lives of Guatemalan refugees outside
its borders through a campaign of in-
timidation, terror, and repression. From
October 1982 to the present, military in-
cursions have occurred, often unoppos-
ed and, sometimes several kilometres
deep into Mexican territory aimed at
refugee camps and settlements; the
Guatemalan soldiers robbed, destroyed
and killed.
The Diplomatie Offensive
A diplomatic offensive initiated in
February of this year (in anticipation of
the Papal visit), and continued into the
month of May, was an attempt by the
Guatemalan government of Rios Montt
to seek repatriation of aIl the
Guatemalan refugees residing in Mexico
through peaceful, more persuasive
means.
The first link in this offensive involved a
visit to Mexico by the Guatemalan Red
Cross. This organization agreed to serve
as guarantor for the general amnesty of-
fered to the refugees by the government.
The Guatemalan radio served as a se-
cond link, broadcasting the Jlgood"
news across the border, while the
Guatemalan Consul in the Mexican city
of Comitan in the State of Chiapas used
the local radio to exhort refugees to
return to their place of birth. Further-
more, it was learned from information
passed on to the Mexican press (Feb.22)
by several Mexican farmers residing in
the area that members of the
Guatemalan "civil defense" had entered
many refugee camps to harrass refugees
and plead with them in the name of the
Guatemalan government to return to
their country. Finally, in May, various
missionaries of the American Christian
Fundamentalist sect to which the
Guatemalan president Rios Montt also
belonged (Gospel Outreach of Eureka
California), arrived in the Tziscao zone
of Mexico bordering Guatemala with
the objective of convincing refugees of
the peace that would await them upon
return with the guarantees offered by a
JlChristian" president.
As COMAR put it (July 1983): "In
general, the Guatemalan refugees do
not (allow) themselves (to be) misled by
this type of campaign. People who con-
tinue to leave Guatemala seeking refuge
from the massacres perpetrated by Rios
Montt's army are the best witnesses to
the deceitfulness and untruth of these
invitations extended by this regime.
There (can be) no peace in Guatemala
while horrors, ... denounced by dif-
ferent international tribunals, (con-
tinue). Evidence gathered by eye-
witnesses indicates that those refugee
families who, deceived by this pro-
paganda, returned to their place of
origin, and were brutally murdered
upon arriva!." (This release, no doubt,
was issued by the external wing of
COMAR.)
The Mexican Response
Mexico, which even up until 1981 ex-
pelled thousands of refugees .from
Guatemala and did not until 1982 sign
the UN Convention dealing with the
protection and basic rights of refugees,
has become one of the world's major
recipient countries for displaced per-
sons, principally from Guatemala and
El Salvador. The total number from
these countries presently residing within
Mexico is estimated to be anywhere
from 200,000 to 250,000. Considering
that a staggering one million
Guatemalans (out of a population of 7
million) are dislocated by the Civil War
and in hiding somewhere in the interior
of that country, many more tens of
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thousands can be expected to eventually
cross the border, either seeking refugee
status or as Illegal immigrants.
Sorne Mexican authorities consider the
continuing migration flow across the
border to be a destabilizing factor both
politically and economically. A series of
measures has been introduced recently
to put the brakes on the swelling
numbers of refugees.
Mexico's deep economic troubles and
the huge number of unemployed and
under-employed among the 70 million
people of Mexico provide reason for
Mexican authorities to be cautious in
allowing more refugees to enter the
country even though most Guatemalans
and other Central Americans do not
enter Mexico to seek work or to im-
prove their standard of living, but
rather to flee repression with an explicit
desire to return as soon as the hostilities
come to an end.
Refugees within Mexico are required to
carry special passes which calI for
renewal every three months. These
passes provide a lease on life for
refugees, and at the same time Mexican
authorities can bide their time hoping
for a poli tical solu tion wi thin
Guatemala. Refugees can stay in Mex-
ico as long as they refrain from using
that country as a stopover for eventual
entry into the United States. Mexico
cannot ignore legitimate D.S. apprehen-
siens about the estimated half-million il-
legal Latin American migrants (in-
cluding Mexicans) entering the United
States each year, nor resulting U.S.
pressure to contain the influx of Central
Americans within Mexico. However,
American official motives are less
plausible with reference particularly to
Salvadorean and Guatemalan refugees
in the United States. After aIl, the
O.S. sends military aid to the two coun-
tries and implicitly supports the counter-
insurgency strategies carried out in the
very region from which the largest
number of refugees originate.
Mexico's official public response may be
reluctant, yet, the Mexican people have
been extremely generous to the
refugees. (Spokesmen of voluntary
agencies did not want to be too harsh
and critical of Mexican official policies.
As they pointed out, the government is
in a political dilemma vis-a-vis the
United States, and at least tolerates the
voluntary sector doing its bit.)
Fears were expressed by sorne refugee
workers about possible friction between
local Mexican farmers and refugees
because of the scarce resources
available, but no such tension was ap-
parent. On the contrary, Mexican In-
dians seemed to readily share their
meager belongings with the Guatemalan
Indian refugees and welcomed the op-
portunity of extending a helping hand
to their own people from across the
border. As far as the larger Mexican
landowners are concerned, they look
upon refugees as a new source of cheap
labour to be exploited in the coffee and
cotton plantations, working under in-
human conditions. The refugees work-
ing in such settings hardly complain for
fear of being sent back to Guatemala.
Refugees in the older settlements and
camps, with the assistance of Mexican
volunteers, have organiZed and mobiliz-
ed their own people to the point where
they are able to meet many of their own
basic needs (Le., clothing, food
preparation, primary health care,
shelter) but they cannot be fully self-
reliant as a community unless they have
land to produce their own food and feed
their families.
One of the most supportive and influen-
tial individuals related to refugee work
in Mexico is the Bishop of San Cristo-
bal, Monsignor Samuel Ruiz, who is the
church leader for the diocese that con-
tains the largest concentration of
refugee settlements and camps in Mex-
ico. A "progressive" bishop among a
generally "conservative" college of over
100 Mexican bishops, he has spoken out
strongly against attempts at returning
refl~gees to their country. A Catholic
Solidarity Committee within his diocese
leads and coordinates refugee help.
The Solidarity Committee is currently
working on long-term plans that in-
volve renting land from neighbouring
large landowners to be farmed by the
refugees for their own food production.
This would help significantly ta reduce
the dependency level of refugees on the
Mexicans, to diffuse possible tension in
the region where local farmers are tested
in their patience and increase self-
esteem among the refugees themselves.
This land rentaI plan would also help
distribute the burden of supporting the
refugees to the nation at large and to
other countries like Canada through
financial contributions.
Mexican Views on Canada's Role
Mexican voluntary officiaIs active with
refugees felt that Canadians could assist
in several ways:
1. by actively supporting and pro-
moting the peace initiative of the
Contadora group of nations (Mex-
ico, Colombia and Venezuela);
2. by taking a stronger stand against the
increased O.S. military build-up in
Central America, and the general
militarization of the region;
3. by speaking out against the flagrant
abuse of human rights by the
Guatemalan army;
4. by supporting morally and financial-
Iy the work of the Mexican and
Canadian voluntary organizations
active in alleviating the problems ex-
perienced by refugees in Mexico,
such as the work carried out by
Canada's major Christian churches,
Oxfam and others;
5. by taking in a sizeable number of
Guatemalan in-homeland refugees or
those currently in Mexico who are
uprooted victims of civil war lacking
adequate protection for their safety
and fearing persecution by the
Guatemalan state.
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